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1. Introduction
In an important paper in the American Economic Review, Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger
(1999) propose a general equilibrium theory of GATT that rationalizes the use of reciprocity
and non-discrimination as the two main pillars of GATT negotiations. Bagwell and Staiger show
that multilateral tariﬀ reforms that are based on the rules of reciprocity and non-discrimination
remove the well-known terms-of-trade externalities and allow countries to enjoy the positive
eﬃciency gains of their tariﬀ reforms. The main mechanism that leads to this advantageous
situation is based on their conclusion that multilateral tariﬀ reforms that adhere to the rule of
reciprocity leave world prices unchanged. Clearly, an understanding of this argument is essential
in appreciating the Bagwell and Staiger theory of GATT negotiations.
Bagwell and Staiger deﬁne a tariﬀ reform satisfying reciprocity as one that keeps the value
of each country’s trade unchanged, where the evaluation is at the initial world prices. Within
the context of a two-country, two-product model in which the initial equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium, they demonstrate that a reciprocity-based tariﬀ reform leads to a new equilibrium
at which world prices are unchanged. Moreover, they then use the unchanged world price
implication to create tariﬀ reforms that yield Pareto improvements in welfare, so both countries
gain from the tariﬀ changes. This powerful consequence of reciprocity, viz. that world prices
remain unchanged, makes the analysis of the negotiation game between GATT countries more
transparent.
Holding world prices ﬁxed has previously appeared as an important insight in the literature
of preferential and non-preferential trading agreements. See, for example, Ohyama (1972) and
Kemp and Wan (1976) for early contributions, and Kowalczyk and Sjöström (2000), Panagariya
and Krishna (2002), Ohyama (2002), Raimondos-Møller and Woodland (2006) and Grinols and
Silva (2007) for more recent uses of this insight. However, none of these papers characterize the
tariﬀ reforms that preserve the world prices at their initial equilibrium levels. The contribution
of Bagwell and Staiger (1999) is quite diﬀerent as it is argued to provide a simple, and policy
relevant, characterization of how to keep world prices constant in a multilateral trading model,
viz. by imposing reciprocity.
The present paper contributes to the literature in several diﬀerent ways. First, the paper
addresses the issue of dimensionality and, in particular, examines the conditions needed for this
powerful consequence of reciprocity to be extended to a multi-country, multi-good context. We
show that, in general, reciprocity by itself does not imply ﬁxed world prices. We rigourouslyReciprocity, world prices and welfare 3
demonstrate that Bagwell and Staiger’s reciprocity rule for tariﬀ r e f o r m si sg u a r a n t e e dt oy i e l d
an equilibrium with unchanged world prices only when the world trade matrix satisﬁes a rank
condition and the number of countries is greater than or equal to the number of traded commodi-
ties. We show that when the number of traded goods is greater than the number of countries (the
empirically relevant case) then there is always a reciprocity-consistent equilibrium with world
prices diﬀerent from those in the initial equilibrium. In undertaking this analysis and providing
these results, we provide a clariﬁcation of the conditions under which a reciprocity-consistent
reform will and will not yield ﬁxed world prices.1
Secondly, we also show that even if there exist some tariﬀ reforms that are consistent with
both reciprocity and ﬁxed world prices, these reforms can only be derived by imposing the extra
constraint of ﬁxed world prices. This, in essence, takes us back to the Kemp-Wan-Ohyama
insight and its practical diﬃculties for guiding tariﬀ reforms. We put emphasis on these issues
because there seems to be a generally acceptance in the literature that Bagwell and Staiger
(1999) show that trade liberalizing reciprocity ﬁxes the world prices. Examples of statements
to this eﬀect may be found, amongst others, in Matoo and Olarreaga (2004, p.1), Epifani and
Vitaloni (2006, p.428), Anderson and Neary (2007, p.187), Ossa (2011, p.123) and Márzová
(2011, p.2).
Our ﬁnal contribution is to provide a new reciprocity rule2. This rule involves countries
increasing the volume of trade rather than the value of trade. Importantly, we are able to prove
that any diﬀerential tariﬀ reform that conforms to this new reciprocity rule is guaranteed to
yield a strict Pareto improvement in welfare, irrespective of whether world prices change and in-
dependently of the number of countries relative to the numbers of traded goods. Speciﬁcally, our
reciprocity rule requires all countries to increase their volume of trade by the same proportion.
Our reciprocity rule always satisﬁes the Bagwell and Staiger reciprocity rule, but the reverse is
not necessarily true in a multi-good, multi-country setting. Finally, we show that application of
our reciprocity rule in the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium always leads to strict Pareto
1Bagwell and Staiger (1999, p. 225, footnote 16) consider an extension of their 2 × 2a n a l y s i st om a n yg o o d s
and many countries that recognizes the issue. See also Bagwell and Staiger (2002, appendix to chapter 5), where
a more detailed discussion of the many goods case is provided. Our analysis is meant to complement theirs by
providing more precise details and explanation.
2Blanchard (2010) and Mrázová (2011) also consider new deﬁnitions of reciprocity. In Blanchard (2010), this
is needed to take into account the capital mobility externalities that exist in her model. In Mrázová (2011), the
new deﬁnition of reciprocity takes into account the proﬁt shifting externalities that are present in her model.
Note, however, the diﬀerence between their new deﬁnitions and ours: while theirs are made in order to account
for new externalities, ours is not. We have exactly the same setup, and thus the same externalities, as the original
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) paper.Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 4
improvements in a multi-good, multi-country setting.
2. Model of International Trade
To provide a rigorous analysis of the issue, we consider a perfectly competitive general equilib-
rium model of the world consisting of  nations trading in  internationally tradeable com-




( )=0  (1)
|
( )=0 ∈  (2)
in terms of the world price vector  (| denotes the transpose of a vector), the domestic price
vectors  for each country  ∈  and the utility levels  for each country  ∈ .3 In this
speciﬁcation, ( ) ≡ ( ) − () is the net or trade expenditure function, being
the diﬀerence between the gross domestic product function  and the consumer expenditure
function  Also, 
( ) ≡  denotes the gradient of the trade expenditure function with
respect to prices and represents the country-speciﬁc vector of compensated net import functions.4
Equations (1)-(2) consist of the market equilibrium conditions for internationally traded
goods and the budget constraints for each country. The market equilibrium conditions express
the requirement that the net imports of countries, , sum to the zero vector, meaning that
world markets clear. The national budget constraints state that the value (at world prices) of
net imports (the balance of trade) must be zero.
It is implicit in this formulation of the model that there is just one consumer in each country,
who receives a transfer of the tariﬀ revenue from the government and has utility .5 Moreover,
with the focus being on reciprocity, our model encompasses the most favoured nation (MFN)
principle, i.e., a good is facing the same tariﬀ independent of the country of origin. The model
is expressed in terms of domestic and world prices. These are connected by tariﬀs, which may
be expressed in speciﬁc terms, whence we may write  = () ≡  + 6
3The notation  is used to denote the set of countries as well as the number of countries.
4Woodland (1982) spells out the properties of the revenue and expenditure functions.
5It is relatively straightforward to extend the model, at the cost of added notational complexity, to handle multi-
household economies. In the case of multiple households, Pareto improvements may be ensured by assuming the
existence of lump sum income transfers between households and the national governments. Alternatively, under
appropriate assumptions, commodity taxes may be used to carry out internal Pareto-improving redistributions.
See, for example, Diewert, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1989, 1991).
6The model may also be speciﬁed in terms of ad valorem tariﬀ rates rather than speciﬁc( u n i t )t a r i ﬀ rates.
Nothing of essence is altered by this choice. Indeed, our example introduced further below is speciﬁied using adReciprocity, world prices and welfare 5
Reciprocity in Bagwell and Staiger (1999) is deﬁned in terms of the outcome of tariﬀ nego-
tiations. In particular, it is required that the initial world price value of the change in the net
trade vector of each country remains zero. The changes in tariﬀs, which are the policy instru-
ments, have to ensure that the reciprocity conditions hold after all general equilibrium eﬀects
have taken place. In our notation, this deﬁnition can be formally written as follows.





0)=0  ∈  (3)
where subscripts 0 and 1 denote, respectively, pre- and post-tariﬀ reform values.
Bagwell and Staiger examine the implications of using this reciprocity rule in trade negotia-
tions within a two-good, two-country model. At the same time, they comment about the issues
involved in moving to higher dimensions and it is these issues that occupy us in the remainder
of this paper. Before moving on to these issues, however, it is useful to provide a diagrammatic
account of the essence of their results in the two-dimensional setting and, thereby, provide a
platform for our own results.
Figure 1 depicts the oﬀer curves of two countries (1 and 2) that trade two goods internation-
ally and choose tariﬀs non-cooperatively. The initial equilibrium point is the Nash equilibrium,
0,w h e r et h eo ﬀer curves intersect and each country’s indiﬀerence curve is tangential to the
other country’s oﬀer curve. The shaded ‘cigar-shaped’ area contained by these indiﬀerence
curves is the set of trade vectors that yield a Pareto improvement over point 0.
Figure 1: about here
Bagwell and Staiger deﬁne a tariﬀ reform satisfying reciprocity as one that keeps the value
of each country’s trade unchanged, where the evaluation is at the initial world prices. In the
ﬁgure, the ray passing through the origin and 0 indicates the trade vectors that are consistent
with a zero trade balance at the initial world prices, 0. Thus, any expansion of trade along
this ray is consistent with the reciprocity rule of Bagwell and Staiger. Thus, it is easy to see
in this ﬁgure that a negotiated tariﬀ reform that is consistent with reciprocity and market
equilibrium expands the trade volumes out along this ray to a point such as 1,a tw h i c ht h e
valorem rates.Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 6
equilibrium world prices are unaltered. Moreover, such a tariﬀ change will deﬁnitely move the
countries within the ‘cigar’ area of Pareto improvements and so both countries gain from the
tariﬀ changes.7
The outcomes of the reciprocity rule in this two-dimensional context are clear. Reciprocity
implies that the new world prices equal the initial world prices and that, provided the reform
is small enough to prevent trade going out of the cigar shaped region, both countries gain in
welfare. Bagwell and Staiger argue that the reciprocity reform neutralizes the terms of trade
externality by ensuring unchanged world prices. We now proceed to determine how robust these
clear-cut results are to the dimensions of the model by considering the general  good,  country
case.
3. Reciprocity and World Prices
Using the reciprocity deﬁnition of Bagwell and Staiger, our ﬁrst task is to determine the con-
ditions under which a tariﬀ reform that satisﬁes reciprocity ensures that the new world price
vector is exactly equal to the initial world price vector. To this end, we proceed in several steps.
First, we can write the reciprocity condition in an alternative, but equivalent, way. Using
balance of trade conditions 
|
0
0 =0 ∈  (see (2)) at the initial equilibrium, equation
(3) implies that 
|
0
1 =0 ∈  This means that the new trade vectors, evaluated at the




1 =0 ∈  (see again (2) ) in the post-reform situation, we can write
(0 − 1)|
1 =0 ∈  In matrix form, this set of conditions may be written as
(0 − 1)|1 =0  (4)
where 1 is the × matrix of national net imports vectors, 
1 in the post-reform situation
1. Accordingly, we have re-written the reciprocity conditions (3) in the form of equation (4).
Thus, the reciprocity condition implies that the product of the  × 1 vector, 0 − 1 and the
 ×  world trade matrix, 1 is the zero vector.
Focusing on (4), we now determine the circumstances under which a solution to this set
7The fact that the starting point is a Nash equilibrium is important. If tariﬀs were not optimally set, the
cigar-shaped area of Pareto improvements may be totally to the right or left of the world price ray. For example,
if one of the two countries adopted a free trade policy then its indiﬀerence curve would be tagential to the ray
through the origin and so the Pareto-improving area would be to one side of the ray. In this case, reciprocity
would lower the welfare of the free-trading country.Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 7
of equations necessarily implies unchanged world prices, i.e., 0 = 1.8 Deﬁning  ≡ 0 − 1,
this equation system may be written as |1 =0and the question is whether  =0is the
only solution. If  ≡ 0 − 1 =0is the only solution to equation system (4), then reciprocity
necessarily implies that world prices do not change as a result of the tariﬀ reform. On the
other hand, if solutions with  ≡ 0 − 1 6=0exist, then reciprocity does not necessarily imply
unchanged world prices and, moreover, will generally imply diﬀerent world prices as a result of
the tariﬀ reform.
The following Proposition establishes the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for reciprocity
to imply unchanged world prices.
Proposition 1. A multilateral change of tariﬀs satisfying reciprocity implies that world prices
remain unchanged if, and only if, the world trade matrix in the post tariﬀ-change situation has
maximal row rank, −1 (that is, (1)=−1). Equivalently, a change in world prices is
consistent with a tariﬀ reform satisfying reciprocity if, and only if, (1) − 1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.9
Analyzing carefully the possibilities that we have regarding the rank conditions in the above
proposition, leads us to following corollary.
Corollary 2. Reciprocity in trade negotiations does not necessarily lead to constant world
prices for the (empirically relevant) case where the number of goods is rger than the number of
countries. Indeed, in this case there always exists an equilibrium solution for world prices that
diﬀer from initial world prices as a result of a tariﬀ reform satisfying reciprocity.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Bagwell and Staiger are aware of the possibility that reciprocity might not be suﬃcient to
ensure unchanged world prices. They argue, however, that in such cases a supplementary tariﬀ
reform will be able to reconstruct the initial world prices and the new domestic prices with no
8From (4) is straightforward to see that tariﬀ policy adjustments that preserve world prices will always lead to
reciprocity. However, the question that we examine here is the opposite: viz. whether the tariﬀ policy adjustments
that satisfy reciprocity necessarily imply ﬁxed world prices.
9The essence of the proof relates to the assumed properties of the trade matrix and well-known results from
linear algebra concerning the existence of solutions to a set of homogeneous equations, such as (4). Equation
system (4) is a set of  homogeneous linear equations in  unknown variables (elements of  ≡ 0 − 1). The
trade matrix cannot have rank greater than −1 (due to the balance of trade or reciprocity conditions) and this
accounts for the reference to the world trade matrix having maximal row rank  − 1.Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 8
eﬀect on the equilibrium.10 Let us explain their argument.





1)=0 ∈  
1 = 1 + 
1 (5)





1)=0 ∈  
1 = 0 + 
2 
2 ≡ 1 + 
1 − 0 (6)
where now we deﬁne another tariﬀ vector, 
2 that replicates the same domestic prices 
1 and
the old world prices 0
Clearly, equations (5) and (6) are welfare equivalent, as each set of equations has the same
post-reform domestic prices. The only thing that has changed is the deﬁnition of domestic prices,
with new tariﬀ vectors separating the domestic price vectors from the initial world prices. Thus,
all real economic variables are the same and the only thing that has happened is a re-deﬁnition
of tariﬀs in one particular way, viz. replicating the new domestic prices and the old world prices.
Clearly, since domestic prices and world prices are connected by tariﬀs, one can always choose
a particular tariﬀ vector that replicates particular values of domestic and world prices (and
thereby tariﬀ revenues).
Does this result vindicate reciprocity as a mechanism for tariﬀ reforms? The answer to this
question is "no" if the objective is to obtain a tariﬀ reform that also preserves world prices at
their initial values. Because of the results in the previous section, reciprocity failed to preserve
world prices at their initial levels. To obtain unchanged world prices an additional tariﬀ reform
(
2) was necessary and it was constructed explicitly with unchanged world prices as the objective.
Accordingly, the important point here is that it is not reciprocity that leads to these new tariﬀs,
but the imposition of the constraint that world prices should remain the same.
Figure 2 attempts an illustration of the issues involved for the case where there are three
goods and two countries. This ﬁgure has the imports for the three goods of country 2 as the axes.
10Speciﬁcally, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) write footnote 16, from which we quote: "In the many-good case,
however, is also possible that reciprocity can be satisﬁed even when world prices change. To evaluate this











1. This indicates that any trade-policy adjustment giving rise to the price vectors 1 and 

1 results
in the same aggregate tariﬀ revenue as would an alternative tariﬀ-policy adjustment that gave rise to the price
vector 0 and 

1 when each adjustment is consistent with the restriction of reciprocity. Since world prices aﬀect
welfare only through tariﬀ revenue, we may therefore restrict attention to tariﬀ policy adjustments that preserve
the world prices. These properties of reciprocity also extend naturally to a many-country case."Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 9
The imports for country 1 are measured negativelyo nt h e s ea x e s .T h ei n i t i a lN a s he q u i l i b r i u m
import vector 2
0 = −1
0 is denoted by the point 0 (as in Figure 1). Orthogonal to this point is





Figure 2: about here
Reciprocity requires that the new import vectors are also orthogonal to the initial world
price vector 0. Geometrically, this requirement is that the new import vectors lie anywhere on
the plane deﬁning the set of points orthogonal to 0. This plane (the dual subspace space for
vector 0) is illustrated in the ﬁgure and labeled . Any new equilibrium import vectors on
this plane satisfy reciprocity.
The new equilibrium import vectors (e.g., 2
1 = −1
1 denoted by the point 1)a l s om u s t
satisfy the new balance of trade conditions and so be orthogonal to the new world price vector,
1.I ng e n e r a l ,1 can be any (semipositive) point on the plane orthogonal to the vector 1,
this plane (the dual subspace for vector 1) being illustrated in the ﬁgure and labelled ∗
1.
One such world price point in ∗
1 is provided by the initial price vector, 0, but it is clearly
not the only one. It is evident from the ﬁgure that there are an inﬁnity of semipositive world
price vectors on the dual subspace ∗
1 that are consistent with both the reciprocity-chosen net
import vectors 1
1 (not shown) and 2
1 (given by point labelled 1). The essential insight is
that the two reciprocity-chosen net import vectors have a plane as their dual space; reciprocity,
by itself, is not suﬃcient to ensure that the new world price vector is equal to the initial world
price vector.
While reciprocity in the two-good, two-country case required the new import vectors to be
on the ray through 0 in Figure 1 and, hence to have unchanged world prices, that is clearly not
the case illustrated in Figure 2 for the three-good, two-country model. Reciprocity now simply
requires the new import vectors to be on a plane and does not necessarily imply unchanged
world prices. On the other hand, if we were to now include a third country there would be three
net import vectors on plane labelled .I f t h e s e p o i n t i n d i ﬀerent directions (so the matrix
1 has maximal rank  − 1=2 ), then their dual space will, indeed, be the initial price vector,
0; it is the only vector (up to a factor of proportionality, of course) that is orthogonal to all
three reciprocity-chosen net import vectors. Thus, when the number of good is matched by the
number of countries, reciprocity has enough structure to ensure unchanged world prices.
As a further illustration of the issues involved we provide a simple numerical example. In thisReciprocity, world prices and welfare 10
example, there are  =2countries trading  =3goods.11 The countries have ﬁxed endowments
of goods and no production. The endowment vectors of the two countries are assumed to be
(050015005) and (025070005). There is a single consumer in each country, each with
the same Cobb-Douglas preferences. The utility functions are (1 2)=( 12)13.A l l t a r i ﬀ
revenue is distributed to the consumer as a lump sum. Without loss of generality, good 1 is
taken as the numeraire with price equal to unity and it is further assumed that there are no
tariﬀs imposed on this good by any country.
Table 1 presents the equilibria for several diﬀerent scenarios. Column (1) presents the Nash
equilibrium, which we assume is the initial situation prior to the tariﬀ reform. The equilibrium
trade pattern involves Country 1 importing goods 1 and 3 and exporting good 2. In this
equilibrium, country 1 imposes an ad valorem tariﬀ rate of 54.77% (21 =0 5477)o ni t si m p o r t s
of good 2 and an export subsidy of 25.6% (31 =0 2560) on good 3. Country 2 taxes its exports
of good 2 at the rate 49.34% ( 22 = −04934) and has a subsidy rate of 11.19% (32 = −01119)
on imports of good 3.12 Both countries are worse oﬀ in the Nash equilibrium than at free trade
(the free trade values are not reported here for simplicity).
Table 1: Example: Equilibia Under Alternative Tariﬀ Policies
Reciprocity Tariﬀ Reform
Variable (1) Nash (2) Reciprocity (3) Price Preservation
2 1.0911 1.0933 1.0911
3 7.0711 7.1237 7.0711
1 0.5067 0.5107 0.5107
2 0.6608 0.6691 0.6691
21 0.5477 0.3320 0.3347
31 0.2560 0.2560 0.2654
22 -0.4934 -0.4441 -0.4429
32 -0.1119 -0.1119 -0.1053
12 0.0835 0.0994 0.0994
22 -0.0966 -0.1251 -0.1251
32 0.0031 0.0052 0.0052
1 0.0521 0.0358 0.0358
2 0.0496 0.0565 0.0565
11This example is drawn from Table A1 of Kennan and Riezman (1990). Their example has three countries
and three goods, so we simply remove the third country to get our example.
12By Lerner symmetry we can convert the tariﬀ rates for country 2 such that it imposes no tax on its export
good (good 2). These tariﬀ rates for country 2 on the three goods are 0.9740, 0.0 and 0.7531. Thus, country 2
eﬀectively imposes duties of 97.4% and 75.31% on imports of goods 1 and 3.Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 11
The equilibrium corresponding to a tariﬀ reform that obeys the Bagwell and Staiger reci-
procity condition is presented in column (2) of Table 1.13 To obtain the results presented, we
keep the tariﬀ rates on good 3 as in the Nash equilibrium, and we alter the tariﬀ rate imposed
on good 2 by country 2 from 22 = −04934 to 22 = −04441 (a 10% change) and solve the
equilibrium conditions and one reciprocity condition for the world prices, utility levels and the
tariﬀ rate 21.T h e r e s u l t i n g t a r i ﬀ reform (only involving good 2 by assumption) obeys the
reciprocity conditions for each of the two countries.
It is clearly seen that this reciprocity-compliant reform results in world prices that are diﬀer-
ent from those observed in the Nash equilibrium. The prices of goods 2 and 3 have both increased
as a result of the tariﬀ reform. This result is consistent with Proposition 1 and Corollary 2;
s i n c ew eh a v et h a t =2 3=,as o l u t i o nw i t hd i ﬀerent world prices is assured.
Column 3 of Table 1 provides the equilibrium values of the "constant world price" reform,
where new tariﬀ rates are derived to ensure that world prices remain unchanged.T h a ti s ,t h e
new tariﬀs are obtained as 
2 ≡ 1 + 
1 − 0,w h e r e0 is the Nash world price vector and 1 is
the world price vector from the reciprocity reform. Naturally, this new equilibrium yields the
same real variables (e.g., utility levels and trade ﬂows) and the same tariﬀ revenues (last two
rows) as the reciprocity equilibrium.14
4. An Alternative Reciprocity Rule
In the present section, we oﬀer an alternative reciprocity rule that is guaranteed to yield strict
Pareto improvements in the neighbourhood of the initial Nash equilibrium for any multi-good,
multi-country world. In achieving this result, the question of whether this policy reform keeps
world prices unchanged does not arise; whether they change or not is quite immaterial to the
determination of welfare eﬀects.
This reciprocity rule is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2. A set of tariﬀ changes conforms to the principle of reciprocity if

1 = 
0  1 ∈  (7)
13There are two reciprocity conditions – one for each country – but one of these conditions is redundant in
view of the market equilibrium conditions.
14It should be emphasized that reciprocity by itself does not completely specify the required tariﬀ reforms but
merely the conditions that the tariﬀ reform must meet. When there are more goods than countries (the empirically
relevant case), the reciprocity requirements leave degrees of freedom in the selection of changes to tariﬀs. We
illustrate this point by some further simulations that, for the sake of exposition, we report in Appendix 3.Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 12
where subscripts 0 and 1 denote, respectively, pre- and post-tariﬀ reform values.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h i sn e wd e ﬁnition of reciprocity, we simply require that all countries increase
their net import vectors in the same proportion, deﬁned by the scalar .
Clearly, our reciprocity rule implies the Bagwell and Staiger reciprocity rule. This is because











0 =0 . The reverse is not generally true as should be evident from the results above. The
reverse is true in the two-good, two-country case considered by Bagwell and Staiger.
We now show that, in the neighbourhood of the initial Nash equilibrium, our reciprocity
reform unambiguously improves welfare in the sense of creating a strict Pareto improvement in
welfare. First, we observe that the ﬁrst order condition for utility maximization by country  at
the initial Nash equilibrium is that ∇(
0)=
0
0,w h e r e
0  0 is the Lagrange multiplier;
that is, the gradient of the direct trade utility function is proportional to the domestic price
ratio.15 Second, we note that the change in the utility for country  from a tariﬀ reform that
moves the import vector in a direction  ( =    0), is given by  = (
0;)=
|∇(
0)||. This directional derivative indicates the gradient of the utility function as
imports move away from 
0 along a ray deﬁned by  and is evaluated at the initial equilibrium
import vector, 
0. Third, applying this relationship to our reciprocity based tariﬀ reform, which
moves the import vector proportionately outwards (setting  = 
0 and  =  − 1), we obtain









¯ ¯.16 This directional derivative indicates the gradient of the
utility function as imports move out along a ray deﬁned by 
0 and is evaluated at 
0.F o u r t h ,
using this tariﬀ reform and the ﬁrst order necessary conditions for the household (ﬁrst and third


























0 is the tariﬀ revenue that accrues at the initial Nash equilibrium, which is

















¯ ¯ ¯  0
for any diﬀerential reciprocity reform  = 
0  =(  − 1)  0. Thus, we conclude
that a tariﬀ reform satisfying reciprocity in the sense that 
1 = 
01∈ ,w i t h









0 =(  − 1)

0. For small changes this can be written in diﬀerential
form as 





0,d e ﬁning  =(  − 1).Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 13
suﬃciently close to unity, is strictly Pareto improving in welfare. Accordingly, welfare improves
for every country for our small reciprocity-consistent reform. The preceding argument therefore
leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3. A reciprocity tariﬀ reform of the form 
1 = 
01∈ , yields a
strict Pareto improvement in welfare for  suﬃciently close to unity.
This result is very strong. Its only requirements are that the reform is suﬃciently small
and that the initial equilibrium has every country with positive tariﬀ revenue. The former
requirement is, of course, needed because very large quantity reciprocity reforms could easily
take the countries well beyond the Pareto improving "cigar". The second requirement is satisﬁed
at any Nash equilibrium and is needed to avoid other situations such as when one country is
initially a free trader, in which case any expansion of trade will be clearly welfare reducing. An
advantage of this result is that it shows that, under minimal conditions, a quantity reciprocity
tariﬀ reform is guaranteed to yield welfare gains for every country. Whether world prices change
as a result of the reform is of no consequence.17 Whether there are more goods than countries
is also of no consequence.
If our reciprocity consistent tariﬀ reform has such strong results, why is this not the case for
a Bagwell and Staiger reciprocity consistent tariﬀ reform? Using the deﬁnition of a directional
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¯ ¯ ¯ ¯


¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
where the last equality occurs because the tariﬀ reform is assumed to be consistent with Bagwell




0)=0 , which in diﬀerential form is 
|
0 =
0. This expression for the change in utility will be positive if and only if 
|
0   0, meaning
that the reform yields an increase in tariﬀ revenue (for every country) with the evaluation
being undertaken at the initial tariﬀ vector. Unfortunately, the reciprocity condition of Bagwell
17Our reciprocity reform can be readily constructed to have unchanged world prices, but this is not a requirment.Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 14
and Staiger, by itself, is not suﬃcient to pin down the sign of this term. Additional structure
on the tariﬀ reforms, such as those used by Bagwell and Staiger, is needed to ensure welfare
improvements.
5. Conclusions
This paper focuses on whether tariﬀ reforms based upon reciprocity imply unchanged world
prices or not – an issue raised in the seminal work of Bagwell and Staiger (1999). We show
that, in general, it does not. In the empirically relevant context where there are more goods
than countries, it is generally the case that a reciprocity-based tariﬀ reform will lead to changes
in the world prices. While it is possible to ﬁnd tariﬀ reforms that are consistent with both
reciprocity and unchanged world prices (as argued by Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, footnote 16),
we make clear that such reforms do not stem from the reciprocity conditon but rather from the
condition that world prices should remain unchanged. In this sense, the characterization that
"reciprocity implies ﬁxed world prices" is not accurate. The importance of whether reciprocity
ﬁxes or not the world price vector is paramount for the welfare analysis performed in Bagwell
and Staiger (1999) and in the literature that followed.
We propose an alternative reciprocity rule that delivers welfare improvements without any
condition imposed on the world price vector. Under our reciprocity rule, countries are asked
to increase their volume of trade by the same proportion. We are able to show that, starting
from the Nash equilibrium, any such marginal reform will lead to strict Pareto improvements:
each and every country beneﬁts unambiguously. This result is general and does not depend on
whether or not world prices are changed, nor on the dimensions of the world economy.
In comparing the Bagwell and Staiger (1999) reciprocity rule with our reciprocity rule, we
see both rules as being within the spirit of the WTO principle of "equal concessions". Under the
Bagwell-Staiger rule, tariﬀs are altered so that, at initial world prices, an increase in a country’s
import values are matched by an increase in its export values. In the case of our reciprocity rule,
an increase in a country’s import quantities have to be matched by equi-proportional increases
in its export quantities. Arguably, the value rule appears to be more applicable in a trade
negotiation situation than the quantity rule. We argue, however, that both reciprocity rules
are equally diﬃcult to apply – in both cases the rules are expressed in terms of endogenous
variables and, thereby, we have no idea which tariﬀ changes negotiators have to make in order
to satisfy the above mentioned reciprocity rules. Future research should focus on characterising
the tariﬀ rate changes needed to capture "reciprocity in trade negotiations". Such focus can beReciprocity, world prices and welfare 15
found in the piecemeal tariﬀ reform literature.18
18Ju and Krishna (2000) and Anderson and Neary (2006) have recently made progress in ﬁnding tariﬀ reform
rules that both increase market access and welfare within a small open economy setup. Extending their work by
considering a two country framework with reciprocity conditions could be a promising avenue of research.Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 16
1 . A p p e n d i x1 :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
To prove this proposition, we make use of some well-known results from linear algebra that
depend upon the properties of the world trade matrix 1. To put the resulting condition in
context, it is useful to note the general rank properties of this world trade matrix.
Lemma 4. Properties of the world trade matrix. The world trade matrix, , has the following
rank properties: (i) () ≤  − 1 due to the world market equilibrium conditions, (ii)
() ≤ −1 due to the balance of trade conditions in the new situation (or the reciprocity
conditions) and (iii) () ≤ min(−1−1), since the rank of any matrix must be smaller
than or equal to the lower of its dimensions.
Proof. (i) The world market equilibrium conditions require that =0 ,w h e r e is a vector
of ones. This means that  cannot have full column rank and so () ≤  − 1.( i i )T h e
balance of trade conditions require that | =0 ,w h e r e is the world price vector. This means
that  cannot have full row rank and so () ≤  − 1. (iii) The rank of a matrix is the
minimum of its row and column ranks. This means that () ≤ min( − 1− 1).
Proof. (of Proposition 1) The task is to determine conditions under which equation (4) has a
solution with 1 = 0. Using a result from Hadley (1965, p.173-174), a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the system of  homogeneous linear equations |1 =0to have a non-trivial
solution  6=0is that (1)  .S i n c e(1) ≤ −1 from property (ii) of Lemma
4 above, it follows that a non-trivial solution  = 0 − 1 6=0always exists. For example, the
reciprocity conditions for situation 1 imply that  = 0 is a solution and so  = 0 is also a
solution for any 0. Thus, the equilibrium solution for 1 can be written as 1 =( 1− )0.
However, this is uninteresting from an economics viewpoint, since it says that one price vector
is a multiple of the other. Normalizing the price of one good to be unity (the numeraire),  =0
is required and so the solution for  becomes trivial. Accordingly, we restrict attention to price
systems that contain a numeraire good whose price is set to unity and which is not subject to
at a r i ﬀ in either situation.
Without loss of generality, we choose the ﬁrst good as the numeraire, normalize the ﬁrst
element of vector  = 0 − 1 to 0 and assume that no tariﬀs are allowed to be imposed on the
numeraire good. Since 1 =0 , the equation system |1 =0may be written as e |f 1 =0 ,
where e  is the (−1)-dimensional vector of price diﬀerences for non-numeraire goods and f 1 is
the (−1)× dimensional trade matrix for non-numeraire goods. Hadley’s result quoted aboveReciprocity, world prices and welfare 17
now implies that e |f 1 =0has a non-trivial solution e  6=0i fa n do n l yi f(f 1) −1.I n
words, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for reciprocity to allow 1 6= 0 is that the rank of
the trade matrix in the new situation is less than the number of traded goods less one (that is,
less than the number of non-numeraire goods).
A corollary to Hadley’s theorem quoted above (Hadley, 1965, p.174) is that a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for e |f 1 =0to only have the trivial solution e  =0is that (1)=.
Applying this result to the problem at hand, we can write that
e |f 1 =0⇒ e | =0 ( 1 = 0) if, and only if, (f 1)= − 1 (A.1)
This completes the proof.
2. Appendix 2: Proof of Corollary 2
There are two possibilities regarding the rank condition: (1) (1)= − 1 and (2)
(1) − 1.
First, if (1)= − 1 then Proposition 1 states that a tariﬀ change obeying the
reciprocity conditions ensures that the resulting world price vector is exactly the same as in the
initial equilibrium (1 = 0). This outcome means that there are no terms of trade externalities
arising from the multilateral tariﬀ reform. The second possibility is that (1) − 1.
In this case, Proposition 1 states that reciprocity is not suﬃcient to ensure unchanged world
prices as a result of the tariﬀ change. In other words, under this rank condition, the equation
system (1 − 0)|1 =0always has a solution such that 1 6= 0 (in addition to the solution
with 1 = 0, which always exists). When this situation arises, terms of trade externalities do,
indeed, arise from the multilateral tariﬀ reform.
Using the above results, we now consider two possible cases based upon the relative numbers
of goods and countries.
Case :  ≤  i.e. the number of goods is smaller than, or equal to, the number of countries.
In this case (1) ≤ min( − 1− 1) ≤  − 1 ≤  − 1, which is consistent with
either possibilities in the above Proposition. If the trade matrix 1 has maximal row rank
((1)=−1) then reciprocity does imply the world prices are unchanged as a result
of the tariﬀ reform.19
19However, it is possible that the trade matrix has lower rank ((1) − 1), in which case a diﬀerenceReciprocity, world prices and welfare 18
Case :   i.e. the number of goods is larger than the number of countries. Here
(1) ≤ min( − 1− 1) ≤  − 1 − 1 and this inequality clearly violates
the rank condition in Proposition 1. As a consequence, a multilateral tariﬀ reform that
obeys reciprocity does not necessarily imply unchanged world prices. Indeed, in this case
equilibrium solutions with post-reciprocity-reform world prices diﬀerent from the initial
world prices always exist.
This completes the proof. ¥
3. Appendix 3: Example
We made the point in the text that when there are more goods than countries (the empirically
relevant case), the reciprocity requirements leave degrees of freedom in the selection of changes
to tariﬀs. This point can be eﬀectively made by referring back to the simulation example.
To implement the reciprocity-compliant tariﬀ reform in the above example, the tariﬀ rates
21 and 22 were altered, leaving other tariﬀ rates unchanged. We needed to change (at least) one
tariﬀ and needed another tariﬀ to change endogenously to ensure that reciprocity was satisﬁed.
T h e r ew a sac h o i c eo fw h i c ht a r i ﬀs to leave unchanged, which to change endogenously and which
to be the policy change tariﬀ. Put another way, there may be many (an inﬁnity of) tariﬀ reforms
that satisfy reciprocity and, hence, there is some arbitrariness in a reciprocity-compliant tariﬀ
reform.
This important point may be further illustrated by extending the above example. To this
end, we allow the 22 rate to fall from the Nash rate towards zero and compute the corresponding
21 values that satisfy reciprocity. By performing this calculation over a grid of 22 rates, we thus
obtain a reciprocity locus in tariﬀ rate space, i.e., a (22 21) locus that satisﬁes reciprocity but
without preserving the world prices at their initial Nash equilibrium values (see Figure 3). We
also plot the utility levels relative to their Nash values for the two countries along the reciprocity
locus in Figure 4.
Figure 3 and 4: (about here)
As the subsidy rate 22 is reduced from the Nash value of 22 = −04934 to 22 = −02 moving
between initial and new world prices may ensue. It is noteworthy that this rank situation is only consistent with
a trade matrix that is degenerate in the sense that it has less than maximal rank determined by theory. If such
degeneracies are ruled out, then reciprocity necessarily implies unchanged world prices when  ≤ Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 19
from left to right in Figure 3, the tariﬀ rate 21 falls from its Nash value of 21 = 5477 towards
21 = −02045. Figure 4 shows that both countries gain from the reciprocity-based tariﬀ reforms
along the reciprocity locus until around 22 ' −38, after which country 1’s utility falls as the
locus moves out of the Pareto improvement set.
Figure 5: (about here)
For each equilibrium on the reciprocity locus we now compute the supplementary tariﬀ
reform needed to preserve the world prices at their Nash values. It is important to note that
this supplementary tariﬀ reform requires all tariﬀ rates to change, and is therefore more complex
than the reciprocity reform alone. A complete summary of these results is provided in Figure 5,
which plots the four tariﬀ rates required to preserve world prices at the initial Nash levels relative
to their values along the reciprocity-based tariﬀ reform locus against the grid of reciprocity values
for 22. Each curve provides a measure of the additional (supplementary) tariﬀ reform needed
on top of the initial reciprocity-based reform to preserve world pries at initial Nash levels. The
graph shows that 21 and 22 have to be further increased, while 31 and 32 have to be decreased
(recalling that they were held constant in our chosen reciprocity-based reform).
In short, these ﬁgures illustrate the important points that (i) the implementation of reci-
procity generally does not completely deﬁne the required tariﬀ reform but allows degrees of
freedom in the selection of which tariﬀs to change and by how much, and (ii) that this sup-
plementary tariﬀ reform requires all tariﬀs to be altered. This supplementary reform is not an
implication of reciprocity, but is deﬁned by the requirement of ﬁxed world prices.Reciprocity, world prices and welfare 20
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Figure 1: World price preserving reciprocityReciprocity, world prices and welfare 23
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Figure 3: Reciprocity Locus
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Figure 5: World Price Preserving Tariﬀ Rates Relative to Reciprocity Rates